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When applied to inter vivos trusts, federal income, estate, and gift
tax rules often produce uncoordinated-and at times unpredictable-
tax consequences. Recent revisions of the Code left virtually' un-
touched the maze of sections that determine the tax status of inter vivos
transfers in which the grantor retains some degree of benefit or con-
trol.2 From these rules, as supplemented by a generation of regulatory,
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R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE & GiT TAXATION (4th ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as R. STEPHENS];
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1. The principal exception was the legislative reversal of United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S.
125 (1972). See text accompanying notes 133-36 infra.
2. Briefly, sections 671-679 of the 1954 Code govern the income tax consequences of "gran-
tor trusts." Under section 673, the grantor is treated as owner of the trust for income tax purposes
if he retains a reversionary interest that can take effect within ten years of the transfer. Subject to
detailed exceptions, section 674 provides that the grantor will be treated as owner of any portion
of the trust over which he or a "nonadverse party," see I.R.C. § 672(a), (b), has a power to
dispose of the beneficial enjoyment. I.R.C. § 674(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.674(a)-l(b) (1960). Ifadmin.
istrative control of the trust can be exercised primarily for the benefit of the grantor rather than
the beneficiaries of the trust, section 675 treats the grantor as owner of the trust. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.675-1(a) (1960). The types of administrative powers that trigger the operation of the rule are
detailed in section 675. Unless exercisable only after a ten-year period, a power in the grantor or
in a nonadverse party to revest the corpus in the grantor will cause the income generated by the
corpus to be included in the grantor's taxable income under section 676. "Under section 677, the
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administrative, and judicial interpretations, the estate planner is sup-
posed to be able to advise his client about the degree of benefit in or
control over the trust that a grantor of an inter vivos trust may retain
without sacrificing the income and estate tax advantages associated
with such trusts.3
Grantors possess broad discretion in structuring the form of an
inter vivos trust transfer.4 Exercise of that discretion produces a pre-
dictable spectrum of tax results between the extremes of the grantor
clearly continuing to be taxed on the trust income and the value of the
trust assets clearly being included in his gross estate and the grantor
clearly not being taxed on the trust income and trust assets clearly be-
ing excluded from his gross estate. Grantors of trusts falling between
the two extremes often endured uncertainty concerning tax conse-
quences until patterns of interpretation in the marginal areas became
settled. Development of a substantial level of consensus concerning tax
results for common types of inter vivos trusts may have discouraged
congressional intervention. Nevertheless, important problems with
these rules persist: coordination between the estate and gift tax rules is
imperfect,5 and coordination between the two transfer taxes and the
income tax is even worse.
Of critical importance is the fact that the tax results in a particular
situation often depend upon both the degree of fiduciary involvement
transferor is treated as the owner of the trust for income tax purposes so long as the income is (or
may be) paid to him (or to his spouse)." D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
GIFTS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 489 (1977).
The principal estate tax sections are I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038. Section 2036(a)(1) includes within
the grantor's gross estate property in trust if the grantor retained for his life, for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death, or for any period that does not in fact end before his
death the possession, enjoyment of, or right to the income generated by the property. If the gran-
tor retains the right (alone or in conjunction with another) to affect the beneficial enjoyment of the
property for the periods described above, section 2036(a)(2) will operate to include the property in
the grantor's gross estate. Under section 2037, if possession or enjoyment of property transferred
by the decedent can only be obtained by surviving the decedent, if the decedent has retained a
reversionary interest in the property, and if the value of the reversionary interest exceeds five
percent of the value of the entire property, then the property is included in the grantor's gross
estate. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(a) (1958). Section 2038(a)(1) provides for inclusion in a gran-
tor's estate of property over the enjoyment of which he has at time of death power to alter, amend,
revoke or terminate.
I.R.C. § 2501 imposes the gift tax on gratuitous transfers of property. However, the gift must
be "complete" for the tax to be imposed, that is, the donor must have "so parted with dominion
and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition . Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-
2(b) (1958).
3. Seegenerall J. PESCHEL J 4.01.
4. See A. ScoTr, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 4 (1960).
5. Although various studies of the transfer tax system agree on the need for reconciliation,
see D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 2, at 622-25, Congress expressly declined to do so in
1976. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976).
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in the grantor benefit or control and the identity of the trustee. The
primary question considered in this Article is whether various policy
considerations6 are properly reflected in the role that fiduciary limita-
tions on the discretion of the trustee have in the existing rules for fed-
eral taxation of grantor trusts. Generally speaking, grantor trusts raise
the question whether a transfer is sufficiently complete to remove trust
income from the grantor's gross income and trust assets from his gross
estate.7 Tentative answers to the basic question can, of course, be made
only after an analysis of the federal tax consequences associated with
typical types of grantor trusts. Accordingly, Part I of this Article con-
siders the grantor's vulnerability to adverse tax results with trusts in-
volving possible personal benefit for the grantor. Part II then reviews
the tax dangers of trusts in which the grantor has reserved no personal
benefit but does have continuing direct or indirect control of the benefi-
cial enjoyment of the trust.8 Part III begins with a statement of the
relevant policy considerations, followed by an overview of the existing
rules and by two alternative schemes of modification designed to align
more effectively the tax results of grantor trusts with these policy con-
siderations.
I. GRANTOR BENEFIT
Two important reasons for creating irrevocable inter vivos trusts
are the reduction of estate taxes and the reduction of income taxes.9
Retention of benefit by the grantor, however, may well result in a gift
that is inter vivos in form but testamentary in reality. Thus, if the gran-
tor retains beneficial enjoyment for his life, the practical result is simi-
lar to that when the grantor devises the property: in both situations, the
grantor has the benefit of the property until his death, at which time the
enjoyment of the property passes to another. A similar situation exists
6. See text preceding and accompanying notes 142-43 infra.
7. Typically, the tax cost to the grantor who has protected his estate and income tax position
will be federal gift tax, which alone will not always deter such a transfer, see J. PESCHEL 1.03.
8. See generally J. PESCHEL 4.01-6.04; R. STEPHENS 9 4.08-4.10; Lewis, Powers Retained
by the Settlor of a Trust: Their Income, Estate and Goft Tax Treatment, 5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 1, 1-20 (1970).
Parts I and II are limited to considerations of federal estate, gift, and income tax conse-
quences. While estate planners cannot ignore state and foreign tax rules, their importance is less
for reasons explained in J. PESCHEL 1.04. The new federal tax on generation-skipping transfers,
I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622, will not be considered because it does not have major direct impact on the
grantor's tax problems. Nonetheless, grantor trusts must be reviewed for generation-skipping tax
consequences that will be borne by the trust and the beneficiaries. In general, fiduciary standards
and identity of trustee can be important, see generally J. PESCHEL I 10.06[C].
9. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1893, reduced but did not
eliminate the estate tax advantages of lifetime gifts, J. PESCHEL 1 2.01.
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in the case of indirect benefit to the grantor where the risk of adverse
tax consequences are more likely to escape attention of even profes-
sional advisers. 10
A. Nondiscretionary Trusts.
Even though a client has been persuaded by his estate planning
adviser to make substantial inter vivos gifts (probably in trust form), he
may well resist a transfer that entirely excludes him from any post-
transfer benefit from the property. For example, a fifty-five year old
executive (G), who has "excess" assets appropriate for inter vivos gifts,
may legitimately fear that retirement, serious illness, or unpredictable
economic developments could make an irrevocable lifetime gift with-
out reserved benefit a mistake. With such concerns, G may press for an
irrevocable trust in the following form: income payable to him for life,
remainder to his children. (Example 1)." Unfortunately, this response
to the estate planner's advice to make substantial lifetime gifts is
clouded by a gloomy tax picture. The date-of-death value of the trust
property will be included in G's gross estate,' 2 and the irrevocable re-
mainder interest in favor of his children will constitute a gift for gift tax
purposes.' 3 Moreover, G remains taxable on the current trust income,
not in his capacity as beneficiary but as grantor of a trust with a re-
tained life estate.' 4
Has G achieved any tax advantages by such a trust transfer? The
payment of gift tax at the time of creation and the subsequent inclusion
of the trust in his gross estate does not trigger a double tax, because the
tentative estate tax determined under section 2001(b)(1) is reduced by
the amount of the gift tax.' 5 Except for gifts made within three years
prior to death, the prepayment of the estate tax in the form of the prior
10. J. PESCHEL 1 4.01, at 4-3.
11. Alternatively, G's wife would receive the income for life, then income would be payable
to G for life. The estate tax treatment of this variation is described in Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-
l(b)(l)(ii) (1958). The income tax consequences are identical to those in Example 1, even during
the period when G's wife is receiving the income. I.R.C. § 677(a).
12. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
13. Only the value of the remainder interest determined by actuarial methods will constitute
a gift. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(e), 25.2512-5(d) (1958).
14. The normal trust-beneficiary income tax rules, I.R.C. §§ 651-662, are applicable only to
the extent that the granlor is not treated as owner of a portion of the trust under sections 671-677.
In this situation G would be taxed under section 677(a)(I). Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(d) (1960).
15. Under I.R.C. § 2001(b), the gift tax value of the remainder interest is excluded from the
term "adjusted taxable gifts" but the date of death value of the trust is included in the "taxable
estate." However, I.R.C. § 2001(b)(2) allows a reduction in the tentative tax for all gift tax paid on
transfers after December 31, 1976. With respect to gifts prior to January 1, 1977, I.R.C. § 2012
allowed a credit against the estate tax for the gift tax attributable to a lifetime transfer included in
the gross estate.
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gift tax now allowed as a credit against the estate tax does offer the
advantage of removing from G's gross estate the value of the property
used to pay the gift tax. 6 Furthermore, income realized by the trust
that is allocable to trust principal, and consequently not distributable to
G, will be taxable to the trust rather than to G.' 7 From a policy stand-
point, the adverse tax results outlined above flow naturally from the
substantial and unqualified "rights" retained by G.18
B. Limited Discretionary Trusts.
1. Third-Party Trustee. Instead of retaining all the income from
the trust for his life, the grantor may decide to retain only that amount
designated by the trustee in accordance with an ascertainable standard,
such as "necessary for support and maintenance." (Example 2). De-
spite the modification of G's interest from an absolute one to one sub-
ject to "objective" facts to be determined by the trustee, the adverse tax
consequences associated with the nondiscretionary trust will probably
not be avoided. The controlling consideration is G's right to compel
distributions that are necessary for his support and maintenance.' 9 In
other words, since the trustee's discretion is limited by an objective
standard, the beneficiary (G) can bring an action to require compliance
with that standard. 20 Practically speaking, the third-party trustee's de-
cisions probably will be final, either because G is satisfied or because of
the traditional deference given by the courts to reasonable exercises of
discretionary trustee powers.2' The legal theory, however, causes the
transfer to be deemed at least partially incomplete for tax purposes.
(a) Estate tax consequences. With respect to Example 2, impor-
tant deviations from the precise tax results of Example 1 could be de-
16. Under I.R.C. § 2035(c), the gross estate is increased by the amount of the gift tax paid on
the gifts made within three years prior to the decedent's death.
17. For purposes of I.R.C. § 677(a), G is treated as owner of only the ordinary income por-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-3(b)(1) (1960).
18. The government's position on the estate tax aspect was temporarily derailed by the
Supreme Court's dubious interpretation of the early estate tax law in May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238
(1930).
19. Unlike the situation in which the beneficiary of the power subject to the ascertainable
standard is a party other than the grantor, see text accompanying notes 110-14 infra, the introduc-
tion in Example 2 of trustee discretion to determine the amount and the timing of a distribution is
not determinative of tax consequences.
20. Letter Ruling 7833062, FED. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. (CCH) T 12,179 (May 18, 1978).
21. 3 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRusTs § 187 (3d ed. 1967). The practical problems associated
with judicial review are illustrated in In re Trust of Salimes, 43 Wis. 2d 140, 168 N.W.2d 157
(1969) where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin split three ways on the question whether a trustee
could consider the type of higher education for which the beneficiary was seeking a trust distribu-
tion.
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fended by the taxpayer. If the governing factor for inclusion in G's
gross estate is the right to only such amounts of trust income as are
necessary for his support, G's executor should be allowed to prove that,
given G's circumstances, some portion of the trust income would not
have been distributed for the designated purpose. While there is au-
thority to support such an analysis,2" the problems of proof are consid-
erable and the burden of proof rests on the executor to demonstrate
what portion less than one hundred percent should be included.23 The
type of trust suggested in Example 2 should never be created in reliance
upon the executor's ability to defend partial inclusion, except in cases
of substantial transfers of property, the income from which clearly and
significantly exceeds G's support needs.
(b) Income tax consequences. The grantor's position that the en-
tire trust income should not be taxable to him is weaker than his argu-
ment that the entire trust should not be included in his gross estate
because of different statutory language. Section 677(a) imposes income
tax on the grantor for trust income that "is, or, in the discretion of the
grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, may be-(1) distributed to the
grantor or the grantor's spouse. ... 24 The third-party trustee who
has no beneficial interest in the trust will constitute a nonadverse
party. Moreover, the "may be" language in section 677(a) suggests
that uncertain or contingent access to the trust income does not fore-
close the grantor from being taxed on all of it. On the other hand, it is
clear that a grantor who is entitled by express provision in the trust
instrument to only one-half of the trust income would be taxed on only
that one-half.26 Where the grantor's right is limited by an objective
standard such as "support or maintenance," he should be entitled to
offer proof that the standard forecloses distribution of some portion of
the trust income to him. However, there is some authority that suggests
the taxpayer's interpretation of section 677(a) on this point will not be
accepted.27 Aside from practical problems of proof, which would be
22. See Estate of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140, 149 (1967) (taxpayer aided by government
concession that entire trust could not be used for support ofgrantor's dependents). See also Estate
of Gokey, 72 T.C. No. 63 (July 30, 1979); Rev. Rul. 79-109, 1979-14 I.R.B. 9 (relating to a trans-
feror's right to use transferred property for a portion of each year).
23. Commissioner v. Dwight, 205 F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1953).
24. I.R.C. § 677(a). The comparable estate tax provision states in part that the estate includes
the value of property over which grantor "has retained for his life. . .the possession or enjoy-
ment of, or the right to the income ...." I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
25. A trustee, as such, is not an adverse party. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(a) (1960).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(a)(3) (1960) (relating to "undivided fractional interests").
27. E.g., Barker v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1230 (1956); Koehrer v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M.
(P-H) 45,068, at 235 (1945). In Barker, the result is more easily defended because the trustee's
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common to both the estate and income tax aspects in this area, a poten-
tial conflict in basis rules between the two taxes may exist here.
(c) Gift tax consequences. In the context of Example 2,28 the gov-
ernment has given its most explicit consideration of the "ascertainable
standard" analysis in the regulations interpreting the general statutory
language imposing a tax on a transfer of property by gift. According to
the regulations, a gift is incomplete to the extent that the "exercise of
the trustee's power in favor of the grantor is limited by a fixed or ascer-
tainable standard . ..enforceable by or on behalf of the grantor
.... "29 However, these regulations allow a reduction in the value of
the gift only by the amount of the "ascertainable value" of the grantor's
rights. Thus, the taxpayer faces the serious possibility of failure to sat-
isfy the burden of proof, which in Example 2 would result in a gift tax
imposed on the full value of the property.30 Failure to supply the nec-
essary proof regarding the ascertainable portion might result in com-
plete taxpayer defeat in each case, that is, the full value of the trust
being subject to both the gift and the estate tax.3'
2. Grantor as Trustee. We have seen that when the trustee is an
independent third party, the grantor who conditions his right to income
upon the trustee's evaluation of facts according to an ascertainable
standard may, in theory, limit his tax liability.32 Does changing the
identity of the trustee alter these tax consequences?
(a) Estate tax consequences. When the grantor is also the trustee,
it is unclear whether his "right" to distribute to himself only amounts
allowed by the objective standard would prevent inclusion in his gross
estate of the "excess" portion of trust.33 If the grantor is also the trustee
power to make distributions to the grantor was "almost without limit." 25 T.C. at 1234. In Ko-
ehrer, the grantor lost for one tax year on burden of proof as to the limits of portion available for
his benefit. In the other tax year, though the trustee's power was confined to a support and main-
tenance standard, the court held that entire trust income was taxable to the grantor, "whether or
not so used." 14 T.C.M. at 237.
28. See text preceding note 19 supra.
29. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958). The definition of "ascertainable standard" is explored
in Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(2) (1958).
30. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958).
3 1. With respect to relief from double taxation, see note 15 supra.
32. Of course, the difficulty of proving the amount of the trust that is not subject to the
grantor's right renders the theoretical advantage largely speculative. See text accompanying notes
23 & 30 supra.
33. The excess portion is the percentage of the trust that under the ascertainable standard
could not benefit the grantor.
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the entire trust might be subject to estate tax.34 Such a result would
flow from a distrust of the grantor's objectivity in applying the ascer-
tainable standard. At the very least, a persistent and significant devia-
tion by G from the ascertainable standard would support court
intervention on behalf of the remaindermen. When the grantor is the
trustee, an arms-length analysis seems abstract, a fact that surely en-
courages the government to resolve the estate tax issue on the basis of
practical power, rather than on the basis of theoretical fiduciary limita-
tions to the grantor's enjoyment of the property.
(b) Income tax consequences. The grantor's vulnerability under
section 677(a) depends in the original Example 2 on a broad reading of
the "may be" language of section 677(a), rather than on the identity of
the trustee. G's assumption of the role of trustee may not substantially
increase the risk that he is taxable on the entire trust income, since the
income tax liability may not be predicated on the limitations upon the
trustee's fiduciary duty.
(c) Gift tax consequences. The complementary gift tax problem is
not expressly resolved by the authorities. Certainly, the principal ex-
ample in the regulations anticipates a reduction in the value of the gift
by the ascertainable value of the retained grantor benefit where the
trustee is a third party.35 On the other hand, the reduction in the value
might be increased to an amount equal to a full life estate for G, when
G is also the trustee.36 Such a result would recognize G's practical
power to benefit himself rather than theoretical fiduciary limitations.
3. Nongrantor Beneficiary as Trustee. Suppose that instead of ap-
pointing himself as the trustee, the grantor appoints one of his chil-
dren-the remaindermen of the trust-as the trustee.
(a) Estate tax consequences. In Example 2, when an independent
third party is the trustee, the entire trust will be included in the gran-
tor's gross estate unless the grantor's estate can prove that there is an
"excess" portion that would not have to be used to satisfy the grantor's
34. Under section 2036(a)(2), the grantor cannot have the power to designate the person who
will possess or enjoy the property. See National Bank of Commerce v. Henslee, 179 F. Supp. 346
(M.D. Tenn. 1959) (court disregarded probability that grantor, who was not trustee, would not
exercise a power to revoke).
35. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
36. Compare the first and second sentences of Treas. Reg. § 25.251 -2(c) (1959). The refer-
ence in the second sentence to ascertainable standards may apply only to cases in which the gift is
complete because the standard relates to the control by the grantor of benefit to third parties (not
including the donor).
716 [Vol. 1979:709
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interest.37 When the grantor appoints himself trustee, the likelihood of
one hundred percent inclusion in his gross estate increases, because of
the grantor's power, albeit in a fiduciary capacity, to distribute income
to himself.3
8
When the grantor appoints a remainderman as trustee in Example
2, the estate tax result will be the same as when an independent third
party is the trustee. Having an adveise party as the trustee does not
affect the grantor-benefit analysis because the trustee remains under a
fiduciary duty to distribute to the grantor if the conditions of the ascer-
tainable standard are met, even if he does have a conflict of interest.
Under section 2036(a)(2), the grantor-power analysis does not come
into play, because the grantor himself is not a trustee. 9
(b) Income tax consequences. The adverseness of the trustee's in-
terest is expressly relevant under section 677(a). Since a child of G
would have an adverse interest in the exercise of the limited discretion-
ary power contemplated in Example 2, it is much easier to accept the
argument that section 677(a) does not apply to that portion of the trust
(if determinable) that is not necessary to supply income to meet the
grantor's right to support payments. Stated differently, the tax avoid-
ance potential is less where the administration of the objective standard
rests with a person having an interest in conflict with a broad or errone-
ous interpretation of the standard. Both the legal right of the grantor to
only that portion necessary for his support and the practical self-inter-
est of the trustee suggest that automatically taxing G on the entire trust
income is not appropriate. The soundness of this conclusion is, of
course, undermined by questions about the viability of the adverse in-
terest test on the facts of Example 2, where the child-trustee may
subordinate self-interest to considerations of family harmony or respect
for the parent-grantor. But in the abstract, the applicability of section
677(a) could be said to depend solely on a determination of G's legal
fights (that is, the portion of the trust necessary for support payments),
making the identity of the trustee, who is legally bound by the stan-
dards imposed by the trust instrument, irrelevant.
(c) G#91 tax consequences. For gift tax purposes, the "substantial
adverse interest" of the power holder is relevant only if the donor
37. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
38. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
39. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1958). However, if the grantor reserves the unrestricted
power to remove or to discharge the trustee and to appoint himself, then the grantor is considered
to have the power of the trustee over the distribution of income to himself. Id.; Mathey v. United
States, 491 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1974); see J. PESCHEL 5.04.
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shares the power with such person.40 Therefore, in Example 2, Gs
child as sole trustee would not change the result that a reduction in the
value of the gift is allowed for the amount representing the grantor's
retained interest measured by the ascertainable standard.4'
4. Limited Discretionary Trusts-A Summary. On balance, the
persistence of the adverse estate and income tax consequences to the
grantor in Example 2 seems appropriate. The overriding legal right of
G to support payments42 from the trust should result in inclusion of at
least a portion of the trust value at date of death in his gross estate, and
in continued taxation on income from at least that portion of the trust,
the income from which is necessary to satisfy his right.4 3 The comple-
mentary reduction in the value of the gift to the extent of the value of
the retained benefit subject to an ascertainable standard is also correct.
The fact that a fiduciary (other than the grantor) is directly involved in
the determination of the actual distributions to the grantor should
neither increase nor decrease the estate and income tax burden. The
grantor's legal right to support payments should prevail over practical
doubts about the independence and objectivity of the third-party
trustee. In truly marginal situations, the government and courts might
well allow these factors to influence their judgment concerning the
quality of the taxpayer's presentation on the allocation issue. Cer-
tainly, we should be cautious about importing as a matter of law the
adverse party test into the resolution of the taxpayer's right to limit
estate and income taxation to an identifiable portion of the trust neces-
sary for his support payments.' It would not be unfair to draw the
dividing line between the third party and the grantor as trustees. At
40. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) (1958).
41. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
43. Section 677(a) should not be interpreted in a way that prevents the taxpayer from arguing
that some portion of the trust is not required for support and therefore is not available to supply a
grantor benefit. The net result might be to confine grantor's income tax exposure to approxi-
mately the same amount he would be taxed in his capacity as beneficiary, which seems appropri-
ate given the limitation imposed on his rights to benefit from the trust. One practical difficulty
associated with this approach is the recurring feature of the income tax issue (as compared to the
one-time estate tax problem). Assuming that a reasonable estimate of the excess portion not
needed for the required support payment can be supplied, is the allocation problem to be reviewed
annually? In general, the government should be satisfied with conservative estimates of the excess
portion andishould expect reconsideration only in the event of a fundamental change in the
grantor's support needs or after a significant lapse of time.
44. Initially it would seem that the adverse party test cannot be avoided under the express
language of section 677(a). As suggested previously in the text, the income attributable to the
"excess" portion could be excluded on the theory that not even the nonadverse party trustee has
discretion to distribute to the grantor income from that portion.
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least, a grantor wishing to establish a trust in the form outlined in Ex-
ample 2 with the expectation of bona fide compliance with the objec-
tive standard would have an ample field of trustee candidates in most
situations.
C. Broad Discretionary Trusts.
The key to the inclusion of some portion of the limited discretion-
ary trust (Example 2) in G's gross estate and continued treatment of G
as owner of some portion of the trust for income purposes is 's en-
forceable right to have distributions of income for his support and
maintenance.45 To undermine the government's strong estate and in-
come tax position there, modification along the following lines might
be attempted: income payable to G for life in such amounts as the
trustee (a bank or individual other than (G) shall determine,46 remain-
der, including accumulated income, to G's children (Example 3). Will
this broad delegation to the third-party trustee of the power to regulate
the flow of trust income to G prevent the adverse estate and income tax
results associated with the limited discretionary trust (Example 2)?
1. Estate Tax Consequences. There is authority to support exclu-
sion of the broad discretionary trust from G's gross estate.4" The ra-
tionale for this relaxed estate tax treatment of such a trust flows from
the language of section 2036(a): the transferor "has retained for his life
. . . the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property . *."..48 The legislative history of section 2036(a) sug-
gests that the word "right" was inserted not to confine the application
of the section to legal entitlement situations, but rather to insure its
application when such a right exists even though the trustee actually
withholds distribution.49 Nevertheless, courts have been inclined to
rely on that phrase as a basis for a strict interpretation of paragraph (1)
(relating to grantor's benefit) 0 and of paragraph (2) (relating to gran-
45. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
46. This would include the discretion to use for grantor's support. See text accompanying
notes 19-20 supra.
47. Lettice v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Gf. United States v. Byrum,
408 U.S. 125 (1972) (settloer's retention of broad management powers did not necessarily subject
inter vivos trust to the federal estate tax); Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.
1945) (trustee having absolute discretion to pay any excess principal to settlor, did not subject
value of trusts minus value of life estates to estate tax under 1926 Act). Seealso Rev. Rul. 76-368,
1976-2 C.B. 271.
48. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (emphasis added).
49. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1932) ("where decedent had the right to
the income, though he did not actually receive it").
50. See authorities cited in note 47 supra.
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tor's control over beneficial enjoyment).5"
In a related context, the government has been successful in includ-
ing an outright lifetime gift in the transferor's gross estate when the
required retention or "right" has been implied from all of the facts and
circumstances. 52 Furthermore, grantor's retention of the discretionary
power as trustee is inconsistent with exclusion of the unlimited discre-
tionary trust from his gross estate.53 Moreover, the government has re-
cently revived the argument that the right of the grantor's creditors to
reach trust assets subject to a trustee's broad discretionary power repre-
sents a form of grantor power to revoke under section 2038.54 These
exceptions to the strict interpretation of section 2036(a) not only tend to
penalize the grantor who has carelessly secured an "understanding"
with the transferee (including a third-party trustee) or who has made a
mistake in the selection of trustee, but also forcefully expose the under-
lying policy question whether the transferor's "string" to the property is
too great in all of the broad discretionary trusts situations. 55
Section 2036(a) could be modified by Congress to require inclu-
sion depending upon the identity of the trustee. For example, an "in-
dependent trustee" test of the type allowed under section 674(c) 56 might
be imported into section 2036(a). The independent trustee test may be
inappropriate in this setting, however, because the trustee with the
highest degree of independence (e.g., a bank) typically would believe
that the trust instrument clearly authorized a distribution pattern that
would give the grantor at least support and maintenance payments
from the trust. Even without an "understanding" with the grantor that
would run afoul of the present rules,57 such a trustee might well infer a
"moral" obligation to supply the grantor with some minimal support
from the trust income, at least when the grantor's other sources become
inadequate. Given the broad discretion granted to the trustee, the re-
maindermen would not have any legal basis for asking a court to inter-
vene for the purpose of regulating ordinary support distributions from
51. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 143 (1972).
52. Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1971); McNichol v. Commissioner, 265
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
53. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2). "With respect to such a power, it is immaterial . . . (ii) in what
capacity the power was exercisable by the decedent .. " Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1958).
54. Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293; see J. PESCHEL 4.02[C]n.20.
55. Lowndes, Some Doubts About the Use of Trusts to Avoid the Estate Tax, 47 MINN. L.
REV. 31, 48 (1962).
56. Generally, section 674(c) excepts from the general rule of section 674(a) trusts in which
the power to distribute income and to pay out corpus is exercisable solely by a trustee who is not
the grantor or a related or subordinated party subservient to the wishes of the grantor. See text
accompanying notes 96-101 infra.
57. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
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the trust. The trustee's broad discretion, even when the trustee is a
third-party trustee, suggests an estate tax result in Example 3 identical
to that outlined for the limited discretionary trust (Example 2).58 At
least the portion of the unlimited discretionary trust producing income
likely to be distributed for grantor's support might be included in the
grantor's gross estate. A larger inclusion would not be foreclosed if the
pattern of trust distributions during the grantor's lifetime suggested a
more generous exercise by the trustee for the grantor's benefit;59 section
2036(a) should not be applied simply on the basis of a frozen set of
factors present at the time of transfer.6 ° Even if a reworking of the
statutory language in section 2036(a) is thought necessary, an
equivalent estate tax result for both the limited discretionary and the
broad discretionary trusts is likely to be appropriate and equitable in
more situations than not.
2. Income Tax Consequences. From the grantor's viewpoint, the
income tax picture for the broad discretionary trust (Example 3)61 is
dismal. Without a trustee who has an adverse interest, the possibility
of distribution of trust income to G would be sufficient to tax him
under section 677(a) on the entire ordinary trust income.62 Since Gs
interest in trust income is not limited to the amount required for his
support, the present language of section 677(a) does not accommodate
the partial grantor trust treatment offered as a possible interpretation of
the income tax rules for the limited discretionary trust (Example 2).63
Correlating the income tax and estate- tax results for the broad dis-
cretionary trust presents some problems. The recurring nature of in-
come tax discourages use of the actual distribution pattern test
suggested in the estate tax context 64 because of administrative difficul-
ties. Moreover, permitting the trustee to make periodic decisions that
will directly affect the grantor's current income tax situation without
preventing the trustee from reconsidering the grantor's income tax sta-
tus in later years seems too manipulative. This is not true with respect
58. See text accompanying notes 22-23, 33-34, & 37-39 supra.
59. Inclusion in the gross estate of an amount less than the portion of the trust theoretically
available for the grantor's support would'be justified if the trustee followed a policy of less gener-
ous distribution to the grantor.
60. Note that I.R.C. § 2036(a) presently applies to situations of required grantor benefit or
control "for any period which does not in fact end before [the transferor's] death." Id.
61. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
62. I.R.C. § 677(a) refers to trust income that "is" or "may be" distributed to the grantor in
the discretion of a nonadverse party. With respect to corpus income, principally capital gains, see
note 17 supra and accompanying text.
63. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
64. See note 59 and text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
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to the single application at the grantor's death of an actual distribution
test based upon a now irreversible predeath pattern of distributions.
The prior discussion did not consider the identity of the trustee.
Should the insulation of G from income taxation under section 677(a)
when the unlimited discretionary power is held by an adverse party
(e.g., one of G's children, the remaindermen) be retained?6 The skep-
ticism expressed above66 concerning the viability of trustee "adversity"
based upon beneficial interest as a sufficient basis for grantor trust ex-
emption applies equally to the broad discretionary trust situation-at
least to the extent that a trustee will rarely resist a request for support
payments. However, it would be reasonable to expect that the adverse-
party trustee would more frequently resist nonsupport distributions,
particularly large distributions for frivolous or marginal purposes, than
would an independent or nonadverse trustee. If such a distinction were
accepted, the application of section 677(a) would be virtually identical
for limited and for broad discretionary trusts: grantor's income tax ex-
posure under section 677(a) would be limited to the portion of the trust
available for his support needs.
3. Gift Tax Consequences. The gift tax analysis of the broad dis-
cretionary trust (Example 3) is complicated by an erratic quality in the
government's approach. Under the regulations the trust transfer will be
considered complete so long as the broad discretionary power is vested
in a third party, even though the grantor may benefit from the exercise
of the trustee's discretion.67 On the other hand, some adverse decisions
on the gift tax issue prompted the government to rule that the possibil-
ity of grantor benefit made the transfer incomplete even though the
amount of grantor benefit was not determinable because of the absence
of an ascertainable standard limiting the exercise of the trustee's
power.68
65. "Under section 677 the grantor is treated as the owner of a portion of a trust if he has
retained any interest which might, without the approval or consent of an adverse party, enable
him to have the income from that portion, distributed to him at some time . Treas. Reg.
§ 1.677(a)-l(c) (1960).
66. See note 44 supra and accompanying text and text preceding note 40 supra.
67. "As to any property, or part thereof or interest therein, of which the donor has so parted
with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition, whether for his
own benefit or for the benefit of another, the gift is complete." Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
68. Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-1 C.B. 181. Cases prompting the ruling are discussed therein.
However, in Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 24, the earlier ruling was clarified "to remove any
implication that an entirely voluntary power held by a trustee to distribute all of the trust's assets
to the grantor as sufficient to render a gift incomplete either in whole or in part." Id. The net
result may be to limit incompleteness to situations where the grantor's creditors have rights. See
text accompanying note 69 infra.
[Vol. 1979:709
GRANTOR TRUSTS
More recently, the government concluded that a gift was incom-
plete by resuscitating an old argument that the rights of the grantor's
creditors to reach the assets of the broad discretionary trust amounted
to an indirect grantor power to revoke; the grantor could incur debts
that, to the extent not repaid by the grantor, would support creditor
access to the trust assets under local law.69 This latest government posi-
tion on the gift tax problem clearly indicates that the complementary
effect of the incomplete gift for gift tax purposes is inclusion in the
gross estate under section 2038.70 This "backdoor" search by the gov-
ernment for a solution to the estate tax treatment of the unlimited dis-
cretionary trust is unfortunate not only because different estate tax
treatment for identical trusts will result from variations in local law but
also because the operative effect of the disadvantageous local law is
questionable. 7' Far preferable would be a direct government attack on
the questionable estate tax authorities granting an exemption for the
broad discretionary trust,72 or, if necessary, legislative relief in the form
of extending the broad "is," or "may be" distributed to the grantor ap-
proach of section 677(a) to section 2036(a)(1).
D. Indirect Grantor Beneft Trusts.
A prospective grantor may be prepared to forego possible direct
trust income distributions to himself, not only to improve the tax pic-
ture but also because he is confident regarding the irrevocable release
of "excess" assets. Yet, he may wish to retain a limited string to the
property, illustrated by the following trust (Example 4): income paya-
ble to 's children in such amounts as the trustee deems necessary for
their support and maintenance, remainder distributable to G"s children
when they attain certain ages. In determining the completeness of this
trust for federal tax purposes, the indirect benefit to G in the form of
satisfying a legal obligation to support his minor children cannot be
disregarded. In general, the same factors considered with respect to
direct grantor benefit trusts-the scope of the beneficiary's rights, the
trustee's discretion, and the identity of the trustee-will produce the
same federal tax result for this type of indirect grantor benefit trust.73
The most important exception is section 677(b), which limits the
69. Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
70. "[]f the grantor dies before the gift becomes complete, .. the trust corpus will be in-
cludible in the grantor's gross estate. . . under section 2038. . .because of the grantor's retained
power to, in effect, terminate the trust by relegating the grantor's creditors to the entire property of
the trust." Id. at 294.
71. See generally 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 21, § 330.12.
72. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
73. See text accompanying notes 16-44 supra.
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amount of income included in the grantor's income to the amounts of
trust income actually "applied or distributed" to satisfy the grantor's
legal obligation of support. This retreat from the broad access test of
section 677(a)74 is quite advantageous to the grantor who creates a trust
for the benefit of his children without any express reference to their
support and maintenance. Although actual distributions for their sup-
port and maintenance will be common, the trust will be excluded from
G's gross estate75 on the theory that neither he nor the beneficiaries
have a right to compel distributions for such purposes and the adverse
income tax result under section 677(b) is limited to actual use of trust
income for such purposes.
E. Other Grantor Benefit Trusts.
The preceding examples of trusts with direct or indirect grantor
benefit that jeopardize the grantor's estate and income tax goals have
been confined to trusts in which the grantor's access is limited to the
income interest. Such an approach isolates the basic features of the
existing tax rules relating to the general focus of this Article: trustee
identity and fiduciary standards. Needless to say, the variety of grantor
benefit trusts has only been sampled. Beyond the obvious variation of
trusts giving the grantor access to trust principal as well as income, cer-
tain specialized types of trusts, such as short-term trusts with a rever-
sionary interest in the grantor,76 and property transfers subject either to
outstanding debts (mortgages) or to indebtedness created by the gratui-
tous transfers (the gift tax) 77 raise problems that need not be explored
here. The income-only grantor benefit trusts adequately illustrate the
broader policy issues considered in this Article.7"
II. GRANTOR CONTROL
A. Direct Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment.
A grantor who lacks knowledge of the basic tax rules in this area
should not be surprised to learn that direct and even indirect retained
beneft from an irrevocable inter vivos trust will typically jeopardize
realization of the income and estate tax goals commonly attributed to
74. The various technical limitations of section 677(b) are discussed in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.677(b)-I (1960).
75. See text accompanying notes 47-60 supra.
76. See generaly J. PESCHEL T 4.08.
77. Id. 4.06; Fuller, Transferring Liabilities.: Tax Effects, 12 GA. L. REv. 33 (1977).
78. See text preceding and accompanying notes 142-43 infra. The classic revocable trust that
enables the grantor without limitation to revest the trust property in himself was not explored
because such a trust achieves no income or estate tax advantages. See generally J. PESCHEL ch. 6.
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such trusts. More understandable would be the grantor's surprise upon
discovery that trust forms in which the grantor and, in some cases,
third-party trustee have only the power to control beneficial enjoyment
in third party beneficiaries will also jeopardize the estate and income
tax goals, even when the grantor lacks any access to the trust income or
principal. Indeed, estate planning professionals may overlook or un-
derestimate the continuing risk of the control situations.
1. Grantor as Trustee. Suppose that grantor G declared an irrev-
ocable trust of certain property: income payable to A in such amounts
as the trustee, G, shall determine, remainder, including any accumu-
lated income, payable to B upon the death of A (Example 5).79
(a) Estate tax consequences. The broad power of G, in his role as
trustee, ° to withhold income from A and to cause distribution of that
income to B will require the full value of the trust to be included in G's
gross estate upon his death under section 2036(a)(2). s! The tax result
here is properly the same as that when the grantor has retained a bene-
ficial interest.8 2 Similar to the situation in which the grantor has re-
tained a beneficial interest for life, 3 this inter vivos transfer assumes a
testamentary nature: the grantor retains for life a significant aspect of
the property, the power to control its enjoyment. Only upon death is
that power relinquished. Inclusion in the gross estate is thus wholly
justified. 4
(b) Income tax consequences. Ordinary income from the trust
will be taxable to G under section 674(a) whether or not the income is
actually distributed to A or withheld for future distribution to B.s5
Continued taxation of the ordinary income to G depends only in a
79. If A were G's adult child, there is very little risk of adverse estate or income tax conse-
quences on the theory of retained grantor benefit. However, a grantor has been subjected to in-
come tax when he inadvertently became the actual debtor for certain expenditures (e.g., college
education) incurred for the benefit of his child. Morrill v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.
Me. 1964); cf Wyche v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5816 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1974) (income
from short-term trusts created by taxpayer for his children's private school education not includi-
ble in his income).
80. Under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2), the capacity in which the grantor holds the power is immate-
rial. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1958).
81. Full inclusion of the trust assets, not merely the value of A's income interest, is required
by section 2036(a)(2). Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958). This is the case even though the overlap-
ping section 2038 would include only the value of the interest subject to modification. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2038-1(a) (1958).
82. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
83. See text following note 9 supra.
84. See Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
85. The capital gains and other income allocable to principal will not be taxable to G, be-
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backward fashion on the broad language of section 674(a), which on its
face resembles the general test for inclusion in the gross estate under
either section 2036(a)(2)8 6 or section 2038(a).87 Section 674(a) operates
as a broad grantor trust rule applicable where "the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the corpus or the income therefrom is subject to a power of
disposition,"8 8 unless one of the detailed exceptions found in sections
674(b)-(d) is applicable. In Example 5, neither subsection (c) or (d)
supplies the exemption because the grantor cannot be a trustee holding
the powers described in those provisions.89 Of the exceptions contained
in subsection (b), only two are sufficiently relevant to require comment.
Paragraph (7) is not applicable because the power to withhold exists
beyond the time when the beneficiary has attained the age of twenty-
one.90 Paragraph (6) requires that the withheld income must ultimately
be payable either to the beneficiary from whom withheld, his estate, or
appointees or to the current income beneficiaries in shares irrevocably
specified in the trust instrument. 9'
(c) Gift tax consequences. Retention by the grantor of the power,
not subject to an ascertainable standard, to shift the income interest
from A to B will cause the gift of the income interest to be incomplete
for gift tax purposes.92
2. Third-Pary Trustee. The principal avenue of estate and in-
come tax relief for G in Example 5 lies in the identity of the trustee or
the scope of the trustee's discretionary power to withhold income. Sup-
pose that G designates one of the following as trustee: (1) C, his
cause he is not deemed to be the owner of that portion of the trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.67 1-3(b)(1)
(1960).
86. Inclusion is predicated upon the power to "designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the property or the income therefrom." I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2).
87. Inclusion is predicated upon the power to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate .
I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1), (2).
88. I.R.C. § 674(a).
89. Nor can the grantor's spouse who is living with him be a trustee under section 674(d),
while such spouse could be one of the trustees under the independent trustee exception. I.R.C.
§ 674(c). Of course, the unlimited discretionary power in Example 5 also violates the "reasonably
definite external standard" of section 674(d).
90. This exception does permit payment of the withheld income to a person other than the
minor beneficiary, his estate, or appointees. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(7) (1960).
91. The language of Paragraph (6) permits alternative takers of the accumulated income
(other than the grantor or his estate) in the limited circumstances where the alternate gift takes
effect on the failure of the primary beneficiary to survive to a date of distribution "which could
reasonably have been expected to occur within the beneficiary's lifetime." I.R.C. § 674(b)(6). The
regulations make clear that this exception would not protect the grantor in Example 5. Treas.
Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(6)(c) (1960).
92. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
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brother; (2) X Bank; or (3) B, the remainderman.
(a) Estate tax consequences. Any one of these third-party trust-
ees would prevent inclusion in G's gross estate, since both sections
2036(a)(2) and 2038 require that the grantor "alone or in conjunction
with any person" have the proscribed powers. Apparently, a "friendly"
trustee, particularly C, a close relative without an interest in the trust,
will satisfy the statutory requirements. So long as the trustee has not
completely delegated the actual responsibilities to the grantor, it will be
very difficult for the government to invoke its regulatory warning that
an "interest or right is treated as having been retained or reserved if at
the time of the transfer there was an understanding, express or implied,
that the interest or right would later be conferred.19 3 It is to be hoped
that even the "friendly" trustee takes seriously his fiduciary obligations
and the possible surcharge claim arising in the complete capitulation
situation. Moreover, occasional deference to the grantor's "sugges-
tions" when the disbursement is well within broad fiduciary standards
should not constitute the "implied understanding" referred to in the.
regulations.94 The appointment of X Bank (unless friendly in the ex-
treme terms suggested above) and B (a beneficiary with an adverse in-
terest in the exercise of the discretionary power) should not raise any
serious problems regarding exclusion of the trust from G's gross es-
tate.95
(b) Income tax consequences. For income tax purposes, each of
the proposed candidates for trustee must be tested against a more
sophisiticated and detailed statutory scheme-section 674. So long as
the scope of the power in Example 5 remained constant, appointment
of C as trustee would not prevent taxation to G on the ordinary trust
income. Under section 674(c), such a broad discretionary power over
income must be held "by a trustee or trustees, none of whom is the
93. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958) (final sentence).
94. See id. In Estate of Goodwyn, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 740 (1973), the government appeared to
have the extreme case of trustee delegation to the grantor. Nevertheless, no "right" in the grantor
as required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of I.R.C. § 2036(a) in United States v. Byrunm,
408 U.S. 125 (1972), was found to exist. Whether the result in Goodwyn was changed by the
revised anti-Byrum provision, Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(i), 92 Stat. 2931
(enacting a new section 2036(b)), depends upon the elastic language "retention of the right to vote
(directly or indirectly) shares of stock of a controlled corporation .. " Id (emphasis added).
Commentators have expressed serious doubts about the correctness of the Goodwyn decision. See
Gaubatz, The Nontaxation of Nontestamentary Acts: Will Byrum Survive the Tax Reform Act of
1976?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 623, 641-42 (1977); Pedrick 729.
95. However, regarding B's tax problems, see Peschel, Family Members as Trustees: Part
I-Tax Problemsfor the Trustee/Benefciary, 2 REv. TAX. INDIVIDUALS 351 (1978).
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grantor, and no more than half of whom are related or subordinate
parties who are subservient to the wishes of the grantor."96 Unfortu-
nately, the statutory list of related or subordinate parties includes the
grantor's brother.97 Membership on the prescribed list does not auto-
matically bar classification of such persons as independent trustees be-
cause section 674(c) imposes the additional requirement that such
parties be "subservient to the wishes of the grantor." However, section
672(c) "presumes" such subservience in the case of a related or
subordinate party unless the contrary is shown by the preponderance of
evidence. This escape valve will hardly be a practical provision for the
estate planner in the absence of a clear pattern of family estrangement.
X Bank should qualify98 as a trustee whose possession of the
power will meet the requirements of section 674(c), thus preventing the
trust income from being taxed to the grantor. Even if X Bank and C
were to act as co-trustees, the grantor would not be subject to income
tax under section 674(c). 99 Because B has a self interest as remainder-
man to accumulate the trust income, section 674(a) does not apply.100
Even if B were related to G in a way described in section 672(c), the
exemption supplied by section 674(c) would continue because a "re-
lated or subordinate party" means any nonadverse party who is on the
statutory checklist.' 0'
The appointment of B, an adverse party, achieves income tax pro-
tection for G at the possible cost of income taxation to B under section
678(a). However, section 678(a) speaks of a power exercisable solely by
a person other than the grantor "to vest the corpus or the income there-
96. I.R.C. § 674(c).
97. Id. § 672(c). The statutory checklist is specific and generally comprehensive, so estate
planners seeking to qualify under the "independent trustee" exception should always consult it to
insure compliance. Presumably, an independent attorney or accountant who is doing standard
professional work would not be an employee for these purposes. Cf. Rev. Rul. 66-160, 1966-1
C.B. 164 (corporate director not an "employee"). See also Westfall, Trust Grantors and Section
674: Adventures in Income Tax Avoidance, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 326, 340 (1960). This author criti-
cizes both sections 674(c) and (d), for "a remarkably naive set of assumptions with respect to the
effective exercise of control by a grantor." Id. 339.
98. However, under section 672(c)(2), a corporation in which the stockholdings of the grantor
and trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control is a related or subordinate party.
99. I.R.C. § 674(c). Clearly, the more-than-one-half statutory exception is based upon the
normal rule that unanimity is required in the case of multiple trustees. 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 21,
§ 194. Therefore, the draftsman should not include modifications that exclude the independent
trustee from voting on the exercise of the discretionary power. Moreover, broad provisions for
removal of the trustee by the grantor should be avoided. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(c)-2(a) (1960).
100. In Example 5, B's power over the trust income should qualify despite the warning in the
regulations that a remainderman's power over income "may be" one exercisable by a nonadverse
party. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(d) (1960). In the regulations' example, the remainderman could
not benefit himself by the exercise of the power over income.
101. I.R.C. § 672(c).
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from in himself."'1 2 It is not clear that section 678(a) applies when the
nongrantor (in Example 5, the remainderman) can enjoy the income
over which he has a power only in the future (in Example 5, at A's
death). 03 Obviously, the principal situation contemplated by section
678(a) was the immediate power to withdraw trust income.10 4
(c) Gi tax consequences. For gift tax purposes, the appointment
of any of the three parties would make the transfer complete, 0 5 even
though an unlimited power to accumulate trust income is held by the
third-party trustee. In contrast, if G were the trustee, the value of the
interest subject to change through exercise of the unlimited power (that
is, the actuarial value of A's income interest) would be an incomplete
transfer. 06 Unlike the situation under the estate tax rules regarding
joint powers, 10 7 the entire value of the property would be a completed
gift if G shared the discretionary power in Example 5 with B, a party
with a "substantial adverse interest."'0° Otherwise, the gift tax rules in
this area of grantor control generally complement those applicable for
estate tax purposes. 0 9
B. Limited Discretionary Power.
To what extent can G improve his estate and income tax picture by
modification of the discretionary power in Example 5 rather than by
appointment of a third-party trustee? Suppose that G is authorized by
the trust instrument to distribute such amounts of trust income as he, as
trustee, deems necessary for A's support and maintenance, with any
remaining income to be added to corpus for distribution to B at the
death of A. Even though the grantor held the limited power to affect
beneficial enjoyment until his death, neither section 2036(a)(2) nor sec-
tion 2038 would cause the value of the trust assets to be included in his
gross estate."o The cost of this estate exemption is a fully completed
102. Id. § 678(a)(1).
103. Cf. I.R.C. § 677(a)(2) (which taxes the grantor currently even if actual enjoyment is post-
poned).
104. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225 (limited power to request trust corpus in any
year).
105. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2(b), (c), & () (1958).
106. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958). See text accompanying note 92 supra.
107. See text preceding note 93 supra.
108. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) (1958).
109. The gift is incomplete only to the extent of the actuarial value of the interest subject to
modification, see text accompanying note 106 supra, while the entire value of the property, the
value of which is subject to grantor control, is included in the gross estate under section 2036(a)(2),
see note 81 supra.
110. An early case reaching this result is Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). See
Vol. 1979:709]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
transfer for gift tax purposes."'
For income tax purposes, further modification of the trust would
be required to prevent the application of section 674(a). Under section
674(b)(6)(A), the withheld income would have to be ultimately payable
to A, his estate, or appointees (if A were given a power of appointment
over the accumulated income).' 2 Under a limited exception spelled
out in section 674(b)(6), an alternative gift of the accumulated income
could be specified in the trust instrument, provided that the donee is
not the grantor or his estate and that such gift takes effect only upon the
failure of the primary beneficiary (A) to survive to a date of distribu-
tion "which could reasonably have been expected to occur within the
beneficiary's lifetime."" 3 The only remedy for G which is consistent
with the original Example 5 pattern of distribution of accumulated in-
come to B at A's death is the combination under section 674(d) of a
power over income limited by a "reasonably definite external stan-
dard" which is held by a trustee or trustees, "none of whom is the gran-
tor or spouse living with the grantor."' 14
C. Trustsfor Minors.
A typical individual considering an inter vivos gift to his minor
descendants will want to retain control of the beneficial enjoyment of
property when outright possession by the donee is to be withheld. In-
deed, a form of trust (or other custodial device)" 5 may well be justified
solely on the grounds that an outright bequest is unsuitable for a person
so inexperienced in handling substantial amounts of property and that
the archaic guardianship rules in many states discourage a representa-
tive form of transfer.' 16 Suppose that G declared an irrevocable trust of
generally R. STEPHENS 1 4.10[5]. The weak statutory basis for this exception is noted in Pedrick
731.
11I. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
112. The statute only requires that the power of appointment be one that does not exclude
from the appointee group any person other than the beneficiary, his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate. Thus, A could be given a special power over the accumulated income
without causing it to be included in his gross estate under section 2041(a), provided the accumu-
lated income could not be payable to any of the four categories excludable under section
674(b)(6)(A).
113. I.R.C. § 674(b)(6). The other exception, section 674(b)(6)(B), would not be applicable in
a modified Example 5 unless other "current income" beneficiaries were added. One writer has
suggested that the entire exception, section 674(b)(6), is too broad and should be repealed.
Westfall, supra note 97, at 345.
114. I.R.C. § 674(d).
115. An example would be registration of shares under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,
which can be thought of as a simple form of statutory trust. UNIFORM GIFTS TO MINORS ACT
§§ 2, 4(g) (1966 version).
116. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS 86-91 (2d ed. 1978).
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property, income, and corpus payable to A (G's minor son) in such
amounts as the trustee (G) shall determine, corpus and any accumu-
lated income payable to A when he attains age twenty-one. No portion
of the trust income or principal can be used to satisfy G's legal obliga-
tion to support A (Example 6). 17
If G died before the trust terminated, the entire value of the trust
property would be included in his gross estate under either section
2036(a)(2) or section 2038.118 This is so despite the fact that G's power
over income and principal does not involve the ability to choose among
beneficiaries, but only an ability to choose the time or manner of enjoy-
ment of the property by A.119 Since A's death before attaining age
twenty-one is statistically improbable, the choice between present en-
joyment by A or future benefit for A's heirs, distributees, appointees, or
an alternative designated taker can be properly disregarded as a power
to determine the identity of the beneficiary. The government takes the
inconsistent position that this trust transfer is complete for gift tax pur-
poses. 120
G's position for income tax purposes is protected by section
674(b)(7) even when the grantor or a nonadverse party holds the power
to withhold income during the period before the beneficiary attains age
twenty-one.12 In the case of a single beneficiary trust the requirements
of section 674(b)(5) are met, since Cs power over trust principal neces-
sarily involves a charge against the beneficiary's proportionate share of
117. Without the latter restriction, G's income and estate tax problems would arise in part
from the indirect retained benefit in the form of satisfying his support obligation. See text accom-
panying notes 66-68 supra. The restriction is included here, not on the ground that it is necessarily
desirable, but only for purposes of confining the present discussion to G's tax problems flowing
from retained control rather than benefit. The desire for flexibility in the event that G's personal
assets are inadequate to meet A's needs, or as a funding device in anticipation of G's death
(whether or not the legal obligation survives 4's death) may justify allowing the use of trust in-
come or principal for such a purpose. To minimize tax problems, G may be encouraged to ap-
point a third party as trustee.
118. See, e.g., Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953). The same result is reached if G
was custodian of property under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. Rev. Rul. 70-348, 1970-2 C.B.
193. Relief from the adverse estate tax result requires appointment of a third-party trustee(s) in
order to take advantage of the generous feature of sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038, which state that
the proscribed power must be held by the grantor alone or in conjunction with any person. With
respect to sham third-party trustee appointments, see note 94 supra.
119. Suppose that G, as trustee, has only a power over trust income. An argument has been
made that section 2036(a)(2) does not apply because the power to designate the "person" who will
enjoy the property is not involved, but the power to determine time and manner is a power to alter
or amend for purposes of section 2038(a). Under the latter section, only the value of the interest
subject to such power (ie., income until A attained age) is included in the gross estate. See R.
STEPHENS 4.109[9].
120. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d) (1958).
121. The same exception applies to a power over income when the current income beneficiary
is under any form of legal disability.
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trust property.
Suppose that G feels that age twenty-one is still too early for an
outright distribution to A and consequently provides for further delay
of distribution of accumulated income on corpus until 4 attains an
older age, such as thirty or thirty-five. Neither the basic estate nor gift
tax consequences described above for the true minor's trust (Example
6) turn on termination of the trust at age twenty-one. In contrast, the
age twenty-one termination date for the income power under section
674(b)(7) shifts the income tax focus to another exception-section
674(b)(6)-which authorizes a "temporary" withholding of income
from the beneficiary provided that the accumulated income must "ulti-
mately be payable--(A) to the beneficiary from whom. . . withheld, to
his estate or to his appointees" under a power of appointment of a type
specified.' 22 A designated alternative taker (other than the grantor or
his estate) can be given the accumulated income if the primary benefi-
ciary "does not survive a date of distribution which could reasonably
have been expected to occur within the beneficiary's lifetime .. ."23
Also, the grantor continues to be protected with respect to the power
over the corpus under section 674(b)(5).
D. Administratipe Powers.
The grantor's estate and income tax picture improves appreciably
as the scope of trustee power over beneficial enjoyment, when not com-
bined with potential grantor benefit, decreases. 24 Indeed, careful se-
lection of a third-party trustee is consistent with favorable tax results
even where the power over beneficial enjoyment is quite broad.,2"
Suppose that G created a trust declaring himself trustee, all current in-
come payable to A for life, remainder to B (Example 7). One might
expect that the elimination of any direct control of beneficial enjoy-
ment would assure favorable estate and income tax consequences to G.
However, the trustee's standard administrative powers, such as selec-
tion of investments, capacity to vote corporate shares, and income-prin-
cipal allocations, have, in certain circumstances, been regarded as a
source of indirect control over beneficial enjoyment. For example, G
could favor A over B by investing in high-yield bonds rather than a
more speculative long term growth stock.
122. I.R.C. § 674(b)(6); see note 112 supra.
123. I.R.C. § 674(b)(6). A similar but broader rule applies under section 674(b)(7) (relating to
withholding until age 21); the income accumulated during the minority period can be added to
corpus distributable to a third party. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(7) (1960).
124. See text preceding note 110 supra.
125. See text following note 92 supra and accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
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For estate tax purposes, the broad language of sections 2036(a)(2)
and 2038 would not foreclose a government argument that the grantor's
strings to the property are sufficient to cause inclusion in his gross es-
tate. With one major exception, the government's campaign for a
broad interpretation of the estate tax rules in the administrative power
area peaked a number of years ago when the First Circuit held that a
combination of administrative powers shared by the grantor with a
third-party trustee was subject to such loose standards that they repre-
sented an indirect control of beneficial enjoyment. 26 After the estate
planning bar absorbed the initial shock of this decision, a steady recov-
ery occurred, initially through cases 27 that found some basis for distin-
guishing the adverse decision, and finally through a review of the
matter by the same court of appeals that resulted in an overruling of
the earlier decision. 28 Today, the prevailing view is that even the
grantor can retain as a trustee standard administrative powers (other
than the right to vote corporate shares, as discussed below) without se-
rious risk of inclusion in his gross estate.' 29
The legal rationale for this restrictive interpretation of the estate
tax sections is the traditional view that a trustee cannot exercise such
administrative powers in an arbitrary or bad faith fashion even though
the trust language (or the state law) clearly contemplates broad discre-
tion. In its reconsideration of the State Street Trust rule, the First Cir-
cuit conceded that a state court could not be excluded in the ordinary
administrative power situation from reviewing extreme trustee ac-
tions.' 30 Some commentators have argued also that a trustee (including
a grantor) would not typically exercise the administrative powers in a
way that consciously manipulates the competing interests of trust bene-
ficiaries.'' Whether the grantor would lose his estate tax exemption by
reserving some administrative powers in a nonfiduciary capacity is, of
course, technically left open by the favorable line of authorities. Some
have suggested that an "implied fiduciary obligation" may still regulate
the grantor who retains such powers when he is not at least a co-
trustee. 132
With respect to a power to vote corporate shares, a grantor who
had retained such a power was able to convince a majority of the
126. State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (lst Cir. 1959).
127. See cases cited in R. STEPHENS 4.08[6][a] n.53.
128. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
129. See, e.g., R. STEPHENS 4.08[6][a]. This conclusion is echoed in Pedrick 725-26, but the
author there advocates reconsideration by the Supreme Court.
130. Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601, 603 (lst Cir. 1970).
131. See, e.g., Gaubatz, supra note 94, at 636-37. But see Pedrick 725.
132. R. STEPHENS 4.1014][c].
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Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum'33 that corporate fiduciary
obligations prevented him from voting a majority interest in a corpora-
tion so as to manipulate the dividend policies and the appointment of
executives and directors. Consequently, the grantor did not have the
"right" to possession or enjoyment as required by section 2036(a)(1), or
the control of such right as required by section 2036(a)(2). Congres-
sional dissatisfaction with the Byrum decision was initially reflected in
a sweeping amendment to section 2036(a)(1) that "retention of voting
rights in retained [sic] stock shall be considered to be a retention of the
enjoyment of such stock."' 34 Criticism of the scope of the anti-Byrum
rule prompted a substantial rewriting now reflected in a new section
2036(b), 135 which confines the inclusion generally to cases involving
controlled corporations. 36
With respect to the income tax treatment of administrative powers,
Congress long ago responded by enacting section 675.' 37 Aside from
certain restrictions against trust administration designed to benefit the
grantor in a way not usually needed or desired in the standard trust, 38
section 675(4) does provide for grantor trust treatment of some stan-
dard powers of administration. The adverse result is fairly easily
avoided because the power to vote corporate shares or to select trust
investment will be a problem only if the power is exercisable in non-
fiduciary capacity'39 and "the holdings of the grantor and trust are sig-
nificant from the viewpoint of voting control."'' 40
For gift tax purposes, little direct attention has been paid to the
problem of administrative powers, although indications are that the
government position would be that the transfer is still complete even
though the grantor retains the powers.' 4'
133. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
134. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(a), 90 Stat. 1893. "Retained" should
be "transferred."
135. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(i), 92 Stat. 2931.
136. Exploration of the details of the revised anti-Byrum rule will not be undertaken here
because they are not central to the principal subject of this Article. The amount of literature on
Byrum is substantial. For two views expressed prior to the 1978 revision, see Pedrick and
Gaubatz, supra note 94.
137. A broad exemption for an income/principal allocation power was also included in sec-
tion 674(b)(8), which permits even a grantor to hold such power.
138. I.R.C. § 675(l) (bargains transactions involving trust property); I.R.C. § 675(2),:(3)(bor-
rowing from the trust); I.R.C. § 675(4)(C) (substitution of new trust assets).
139. Compare the anti-Byrum rule in which inclusion in the gross estate results whether or not
the power to vote is held in a fiduciary capacity. S. REP. No. 745, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1978) (Part B).
140. For a criticism of section 675, see Pedrick 731 n.130 ("Some of us think it overly gener-
ous").
141. J. PESCHEL I 5.05[H].
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III. EVALUATION OF EXISTING LAW
The lengthy analysis of the federal tax treatment of typical irrevo-
cable inter vivos trusts sets the stage for a response to the central ques-
tion raised in the introduction to this Article: How do the existing
income, estate, and gift tax rules fare when tested by various policy
considerations? The use of the plural emphasizes that it is not appro-
priate to reduce the inquiry to a determination whether existing law
adequately protects against "tax avoidance." This rubric either consti-
tutes a question-begging label for the basic problem or improperly ex-
cludes important considerations affecting the constructicn of a balanced
tax system in this area. To be sure, the dominant question is the extent
to which the grantor of an irrevocable inter vivos trust should be per-
mitted the estate and income tax advantages normally associated with
such transfers when he has retained some degree of benefit or control.
Final resolution, however, must take into account other public policy
factors, some of which reflect the goals or legitimate interests of grant-
ors, trustees, and other parties directly involved in the trust.
Since more than one federal tax is involved, the estate planner and
his client are entitled to operate within a legal context that does not
unnecessarily or incoherently establish different rules for the same ba-
sic transaction. Moreover, the rules should be formulated and adminis-
tered with the maximum feasible degree of certainty. Not only are the
immediate parties in interest justified in expecting a system that fosters
stable estate planning at the planning and drafting stages, 4 2 but the
public interest supports a system that minimizes the cost, in terms of
private and public resources, of controversy after the event. Even at
the drafting stage, the rules should not be so complex and uncertain as
to entrap the unwary professional who is making a bona fide effort to
comply with them.
Factors external to the specific tax context should be given appro-
priate weight. Thus, the content and operation of nontax fiduciary law
should not be disregarded and normal assumptions regarding human
behavior, instincts, and goals should.prevail. A degree of tolerance for
"tax avoidance" by a few greedy grantors might be preferred to the
creation of a system that will operate as a straightjacket for the major-
ity, whose inclinations may not be so base. On the other hand, a large
percentage of Americans will neither be interested in nor be able to
afford a "complex" estate plan, which includes irrevocable inter vivos
142. Professor Westfall worried that too much weight was being given to this factor when
Congress drafted section 674 (relating to power to control beneficial enjoyment in the income tax
setting). See Westfall, supra note 97, at 328.
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trusts. Consequently, the rules governing such transfers should not be-
come so relaxed that the wealthy few can achieve substantial tax sav-
ings not readily available to the majority. 4 3
On balance, there is a strong argument that the present federal tax
rules governing irrevocable inter vivos trusts reflect an inadequate re-
sponse to these various policy considerations. The problems with the
existing system are so diverse that both sides (that is, the tough tax
reformer and the person more sympathetic to the interests of the parties
directly affected) have ample ground to complain. Since each side can
isolate specific problems that indicate that the rules are either too gen-
erous or too tough, it is difficult for anyone to stake out a neutral posi-
tion without making, or at least expressing, an underlying assumption.
To increase the utility of this Article, two alternative packages for revi-
sions in the present system will be described, one of which makes them
tougher and the other, more relaxed. It is believed that many people
would agree that the present rules are unsatisfactory but that reason-
able people will disagree over which direction reform should take.
A. Tougher Rules.
A reader who assigns a high priority to the construction of barriers
to tax avoidance among high-income and wealthy individuals will be
attracted to this position. Since the irrevocable inter vivos trust is
widely used by this group, the present rules would seem to be a ready
target for revision. A responsible tough tax reformer will not openly
advocate uncertainty or excessive complexity in the rules, but he may
feel less sympathy for a target group that has traditionally been able to
afford the required professional counseling. He will also be cautious
about importation of nontax fiduciary law (where the role of regulation
in the public interest is more limited) and will be more willing to as-
sume the worst about the motives of grantors of irrevocable inter vivos
trusts. Surely, he will share with his friends on the other side of the
fence an appropriate degree of outrage at manifestations of incoher-
ence in the present scheme.
In general, the existing rules with respect to fiduciary standards
and identity of the trustee (particularly, the income tax segment) 44
143. Presently, the federal estate tax operates as a real burden on a limited percentage of the
population. In 1972, the number of estate tax returns filed that reflected taxable estates repre-
sented only 6.1% of the adult population deaths during the year. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P.
MCDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 70 (1977). The increased
exemptions reflected in the estate tax credit, I.R.C. § 2010, will further decrease that percentage.
In contrast, the federal income tax exacts a toll on a substantial percentage of the population.
144. Even if the tough tax reformer is not able to persuade others of a need to coordinate the
transfer and income tax rules, he can defend the toughness of the existing income tax rules by
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seem to come closer to the tough tax reformer's goals than to his oppo-
site's goals. Nevertheless, some significant leaks in the system could be
plugged by explicit legislation.
1. Estate Tax. The feature of both sections 2036(a) and 2038 that
excludes from the grantor's gross estate the value of trust assets where
he had the foresight to pick a third party trustee seems far too generous.
Exclusion from the gross estate seems improper when the trustee is
given a broad discretionary power to distribute trust income or princi-
pal to the grantor. 45 The income tax requirement in section 677(a)
that the power at least be shared with a person with a substantial bene-
ficial interest adversely affected by exercise in favor of the grantor 46
seems preferable to the grantor's ability under sections 2036 and 2038
to secure estate tax exemption by appointment of a third party who has
no conceivable pecuniary reason for resisting grantor advice.
Far more debatable is the question whether the "independent
trustee" exception of section 674(c) should be adopted for both estate
and income tax purposes when the issue is potential grantor benefit. It
would not be unreasonable to retain the income tax distinction that
allows an independent trustee exception in the case of broad powers to
control beneficial enjoyment among persons other than the grantor, 47
but that narrows the exception in the grantor benefit situations to a
requirement of sharing with an adverse party. 48
With respect to administrative powers, the present law would seem
unsatisfactory to the tough tax reformer: Congress, by focusing on a
single power in the anti-Byrum amendment, has only created an ad hoc
exception to the present "common law" interpretation of sections 2036
and 2038; 149 and this common law underestimates the degree of control
over beneficial enjoyment attributable to the other powers. 50
2. Limited Direct Powers Over Beneficial Enjoyment. As dis-
arguing that the recurring nature of the income tax supplies a greater incentive for tax avoidance
by persons in the high income tax category. Thus, the present sophistication of the income tax
rules would, in the eyes of such a person, need to be retained even if no substantial changes are
made in the transfer tax area.
145. See text accompanying notes 47-60 supra.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(a) (1960); see D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 2, at 622-
24.
147. I.R.C. § 674(c).
148. Id. § 677.
149. For a favorable view of the posture of the law outside the Byrum situation, see Gaubatz,
supra note 94.
150. See Pedrick 718. Professor Pedrick would assign to the Supreme Court the task of un-
winding the damage done by the prior court decisions. Id.
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cussed previously,' 5 ' both the present estate and income tax rules grant
a broad exemption when the power of the trustee (even a grantor
trustee) over trust income and principal is subject to an ascertainable
standard. If the trustee is authorized to distribute trust income or
corpus to a beneficiary in such amounts as he deems necessary for such
beneficiary's "support and maintenance," the trust is not included in
the grantor's gross estate152 and the income will not be taxable to the
grantor under section 674(b)(5) (relating to a power over corpus) or
under section 674(d) (relating to a power over income) provided that
neither the grantor nor a spouse living with the grantor is one of the
trustees. The ascertainable standard exceptions do have major disad-
vantages: the unwary draftsman has often stumbled into a trap; 53 the
rule has tended to breed litigation, particularly in the estate tax area; 54
and in its pure form (for example, "support and maintenance") the
standards may permit too much control over beneficial enjoyment to
allow exclusion when similar nonadministrative powers would require
inclusion. 5
5
3. Transfer Tax Coordination. For many years, there has been a
consensus that the federal transfer tax rules need to be revised in order
to prevent a particular transfer from being subject to both the estate
and gift tax.' 56 Consequently, any congressional revision of the rules
regarding grantor trusts should finally resolve this long standing weak-
ness.
B. More Relaxed Rules.
A reader may not only rebel against the inconsistency of the ex-
isting rules, but may also feel that they are too restrictive because of a
different policy perspective. Thoughtful individuals can hardly be ex-
pected to object to rules designed to prevent "unearned" estate and in-
151. See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
152. E.g., Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). This case is on the Pedrick list for
reconsideration. Pedrick 731.
153. With respect to whether the property is included under section 2041 in the power holder's
gross estate, see, e.g., Franz v. United States, 77-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 13,182 (E.D. Ky. 1977)
(relating to decedents' "care, maintenance and welfare").
154. Indeed, one of the reasons for the 1969 adoption of restrictive charitable remainder trust
rules was the controversy over ascertainable standards, which had an impact on the amount of the
charitable deduction. S. REp. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2116.
155. Does a fur coat for the beneficiary fall within the standard? A trip to Europe? Private
secondary education? Dancing lessons? The difficulty in administration of the support standard
is illustrated by Wyche v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5816 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1974), in which
the taxpayer prevailed where the issue was taxation to the grantor under section 677(b).
156. See authorities cited in D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 2, at 622-24.
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come tax savings from an irrevocable inter vivos trust when the
retained grantor benefit or control is substantial. Nevertheless, the
present tax system might well appear to reflect "overkill" in that under-
lying assumptions or requirements overlook the possibility-and per-
haps the probability-of bona fide performance by most trustees in
meeting their primary fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries. Even
more undesirable is the direct incentive, particularly under the income
tax rules, to select a trustee who assures tax protection to the grantor at
the cost of undesirable nontax consequences. Furthermore, one can ar-
gue in favor of a set of rules that does not operate as a significant disin-
centive to making lifetime gifts. 157
1. Grantor Benefit Trusts. In general, the advocate of more re-
laxed tax rules should find it difficult to quarrel with the broad feature
of inclusion in the grantor's gross estate under section 2036(a)(1) or
with continued grantor taxation on trust income under section 677
when the grantor has retained direct and even indirect benefit from the
trust income and corpus. 158 Indeed, the advocate may even be forced
to agree with the tough tax reformer's objection that the apparent estate
tax exemption 59 when a third-party trustee is given a broad discretion-
ary power to make distributions to the grantor is too generous. The
inequity of this third-party trustee exemption is highlighted by compar-
ing the estate tax result of two similar trusts. In the first, the third-party
trustee has broad discretion in making distributions of income to the
grantor and consistently does so for the grantor's support and mainte-
nance. The trust is excluded from the grantor's gross estate.16 0 In the
second trust, the trustee's discretion is limited: he is required to make
distributions to the grantor for his support and maintenance. At least
part of the trust will be included in the grantor's gross estate.' 6'
On the other hand, section 677(a) overreaches if it taxes the gran-
tor on the entire trust income even though his access is expressly lim-
ited to an ascertainable standard and the level of trust income is such
that some portion of the trust income will never be distributed to the
157. Of course, Congress has drifted away from past features of the transfer tax system (te.,
lower gift tax rates and separate transfer taxes) that encouraged lifetime gifts generally. The unifi-
cation of the estate and gift taxes based upon a single rate scale consciously reflected a partial
abandonment of the incentive philosophy. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1976).
158. American Bankers Association, Discussion Draft of Transfer Tax Statute and Explanatory
Comments 124, in Public Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on General Tax
Reform, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, 3747, 3877 (1973).
159. See text accompanying notes 47-60 supra.
160. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
161. See text preceding and accompanying note 19 supra.
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grantor. 162 A grantor should not be foreclosed from arguing for either
estate or income tax purposes that his right, including his right under a
discretionary power held by a third-party trustee, to trust income and
corpus could never encompass the entirety of the trust. 163
2. Grantor Control Trusts. When the grantor does not have direct
or indirect access to trust income and principal for personal benefit, an
appealing argument can be made that the existing rules should not be
tightened excessively and should be refined to reflect less cynical as-
sumptions regarding human behavior.
(a) Direct distribution powers. Under sections 2036(a)(2) and
2038, exclusion from the gross estate whenever the grantor does not,
alone or in conjunction with another person, have the power to control
beneficial enjoyment is inconsistent with the tighter income tax rules
that deal with the reality of "friendly trustees." Perhaps the estate tax
exclusion should be limited to situations in which some form of in-
dependent trustee test is satisfied. 64 Whether the exclusion should be
expanded to include trusts in which the trustee is an adverse party will
be considered below.1 65 With respect to a power subject to an ascer-
tainable standard, a more consistent set of estate and income tax rules
should be formulated. The tough tax reformer might insist that the
reconciliation be achieved by incorporating into the estate tax provi-
sions the income tax requirement of section 674(d) that neither the
grantor nor a spouse living with him can be one of the trustees.' 66 On
the other hand, a broad exemption for powers subject to an ascertain-
able standard might be preserved despite uncertainty about its applica-
tion,167 on the ground that a grantor who has a careful draftsman
should be rewarded for limiting the grantor's string to the property.
A more radical revision of the present rules would involve the
wholesale importation of the various exceptions reflected in sections
674(b)-(d) into the estate tax area, including the exceptions permitting
possession of limited powers by the grantor. 68 It is not hard to defend
162. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
163. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
164. Cf, I.R.C. § 674(a) (independent trustee test for income tax purposes).
165. See text accompanying notes 171-80 infra.
166. Such a limitation would change the present estate tax result, where even the grantor can
hold the power. Similarly, he can avoid income taxation where the power subject to the ascertain-
able standard covers invasion of corpus. I.R.C. § 674(b)(5). (Section 674(d) relates only to a
power over income.) Some tax reformers have a negative view of even section 674(d). See, e.g.,
Westfall, supra note 97, at 345.
167. See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
168. Particularly appealing for incorporation into the estate tax area would be section
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these exemptions if one assumes that the typical trustee will approach
the exercise of these limited powers over beneficial enjoyment in a
bona fide manner with due regard to fiduciary obligations owed benefi-
ciaries with conflicting interests. For some, allowing the grantor to be a
trustee would be too generous, even if no independent trustee require-
ment similar to that in section 674(c) were incorporated into the estate
tax laws. However, the advocate of a more relaxed approach to trustee
powers over beneficial control can point out that some of the present
tax rules make assumptions about typical fiduciary behavior not sus-
tained by any known broad contemporary studies. 69 Preservation of
the more restrictive features 70 of the existing rules regarding trustee
identity might not be justified in the absence of evidence that trustees
are deferring on a wholesale and persistent basis to grantor directions
or "suggestions."
One feature of the current income tax rules regarding grantor
trusts appears initially to be sound in theory, but closer examination
reveals several weaknesses. A grantor can secure protection against in-
come taxation by giving the power over beneficial enjoyment to a per-
son who has an interest in the trust that would be adversely affected by
exercise of the power. For example, an irrevocable inter vivos trust,
making B trustee, with income payable to A for life in such amounts as
the trustee shall determine and then remainder to B causes no problem
for the grantor even if the trustee has a power to revoke the trust and
revest the property in the grantor. Section 676(a) would not apply be-
cause any exercise by B of the power to revoke would adversely affect
his own interest in the trust.' 7'
674(b)(7), which permits the temporary withholding of income during a period of a beneficiary's
legal disability (including minority). See generally text accompanying notes 117-23 supra. The
adverse estate tax result, see text accompanying note 118 supra, would be changed by this propo-
sal. Even some tough tax reformers do not oppose section 674(b)(7). See, e.g., Westfall, supra
note 97, at 336.
169. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 116, at 1372 (abuses regarding pension
trusts).
170. For example, while the exceptions contained in section 674(b) permit even the grantor or
a nonadverse party to be trustee, the limited range of these exceptions and their highly technical
features put a pressure on the grantor to utilize the independent trustee exception, section 674(c),
which often requires that a bank be included as one of the trustees. The cost of this choice is a
disadvantage, particularly where the grantor desires to appoint a relative who would be willing to
serve for no (or at least a reduced) fee. Also, the present rules encourage appointment of a trustee
who is an adverse party.
171. Since B also has a power to accumulate income that would be added to corpus distrib-
uted to him upon A's death, neither the ordinary nor corpus income would be taxable to G. Cf.
Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(d) (1960) (the interest of a remainderman is not adverse to the exercise of
a power over any income interest preceeding his remainder). No problem arises under section
674(a) (relating to control over beneficial enjoyment) because of B's status as an adverse party. B
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B's obvious conflict of interest supplies the justification for the tax
exemption; the conflict also creates ancillary problems. First, it is very
inappropriate for the federal tax laws to include an exception that cre-
ates a strong incentive to select the trustee on a basis contrary to pre-
ferred trust policies. 172 Trustees should be selected with a mind
towards maximum neutrality in resolving the delicate and often con-
flicting interests of various beneficiaries. The problems for the typical
fiduciary should not be unnecessarily aggravated by encouraging the
negative factor of trustee self-interest.
Traditional trust law places a high priority on the trustee's duty of
loyalty to the beneficiaries, which is fortified by tough rules regulating
self-dealing behavior by trustees. 173 The strength of this policy is illus-
trated by the prohibition in at least one key state of exercise by a trustee
of a power over trust income or principal for his own benefit. 174 Fur-
thermore, assigning fiduciary powers to a person with an adverse inter-
est cures the grantor's federal income tax problem at the cost of
creating both estate and income tax consequences for the holder of the
power. The trustee/beneficiary may be deemed to have a general
power of appointment for purposes of including a portion of the trust
assets in his gross estate, 75 and the trust income may be taxed to the
trustee whether or not distributed to him.' 76 The adverse tax effects to
the trustee may be inadvertently ignored or underestimated by the less
experienced practitioner who sees only the "adverse party" exception
as a solution for the grantor's income tax problems. 177 Finally, the ap-
plication of the adverse party test even for income tax purposes can be
a tricky business, t78 and the issue of what constitutes a "substantial"
adverse interest has had to be litigated in some marginal situations.' 79
Elimination of the adverse party exception in the income tax area
would even qualify as an independent trustee, whether or not related to G since section 672(c)
defines a related or subordinate party to exclude any adverse party.
172. "The most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust is the
duty of loyalty." 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 21, § 170, at 1297.
173. See generaly Id. § 170.
174. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-10.1 (McKinney 1967). Apparently, this express
bar against combining the trustee and beneficiary relationships is not the prevailing view. G.
BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 30 (5th ed. 1973).
175. I.R.C. § 2041.
176. I.R.C. § 678. See generally Peschel, supra note 95.
177. For gift tax purposes, a power shared by the grantor with an adverse party will make the
transfer a completed gift. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) (1958).
178. The regulations, see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-L(b) to 1(d) (1960), are sprinkled with
several "may be" qualifications that emphasize their nonexhaustive quality.
179. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(a) (1960); see also, e.g., Chase Nat'l Bank v. Com-
missioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955); Commissioner v. Katz, 139 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1943).
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and resistance to its extension into the estate tax area ISO on the grounds
of strong contrary nontax policy considerations would probably not be
a position favored by those who prefer a relaxed approach to federal
taxation of grantor trusts. Nevertheless, such a person might see this
apparent step backward in pure tax results as a reflection of a better
integration of the nontax factors involved in planning these types of
trusts.
(b) Administrative powers. Since standard administrative powers
held by a trustee (including the grantor) are generally not a major
source of estate and income exposure for the grantor,' 8' the person ad-
vocating a more relaxed tax scheme for irrevocable inter vivos trusts
should be satisfied with the current state of the law. 182 Of course, the
major exception to this rosy picture is the congressional reversal of the
Supreme Court decision in Byrum relating to the retained power to
vote corporate stock transferred into trust.'83 Until the 1978 revi-
sion,184 the criticism that the anti-Byrum rule swept too broadly by ap-
plying to shares in a corporation not controlled by the grantor was well
justified. The broader objection that Congress has made a mistake in
isolating one administrative power for adverse estate tax treatment is
harder to appraise. Certainly, the fact that a grantor would run afoul
of the new section 2036(b),' 85 but would be exempt from income taxa-
tion under section 675(4) so long as the power to vote is held in a
fiduciary capacity (or subject to approval by one in such capacity) does
appear to represent another annoying lapse in federal tax coordination.
Furthermore, adverse estate tax treatment of the single administrative
power in the context of the generous broader tax picture for adminis-
trative powers does increase the risk that the careless or less exper-
ienced estate planner will make a mistake. An argument has been
made that this power to vote shares is not ordinarily retained for the
primary purpose of exercising continuing control of the type intended
to be proscribed by the present estate and income tax rules. 86 Perhaps
the most effective defense of the selective treatment of this power is the
fact that the grantor retains potential indirect control of beneficial en-
180. See A.L.I., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND REPORTERS' STUDIES 5, 8 (1969) (recommending extension of the
adverse party rule to estate and gift taxation).
181. See text accompanying notes 124-41 supra.
182. The tough tax reformer will typically prefer a tightening in this area. See, e.g., Pedrick.
183. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra.
184. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(i), 92 Stat. 2931.
185. Whether the power is held in a fiduciary capacity is irrelevant. S. REP. No. 745, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978) (pt. II B).
186. Gaubatz, supra note 94, at 626-27.
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joyment not only for others but also for himself.'1 7 Thus, even the
more relaxed tax treatment supporter might have to concede that the
double-barrel grantor connection might justify this exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
Any attempt to realize all or any substantial portion of either the
tough tax reform or the more relaxed approach to federal taxation of
grantor trusts will require legislative action. Not only are specific fea-
tures of the present statutory scheme at stake,' 88 but even where possi-
ble, 189 many estate planning professionals will not be enthusiastic
about remanding to the Supreme Court reconsideration of the existing
rules. 90 Too much time will be consumed in finishing the project; pre-
sumption of a receptive Court's reaction to such a task is debatable;' 91
and the Court's past record is hardly a monument to thoughtful 9 or
consistent 93 performance.
On the other hand, one should not underestimate the difficulties of
a legislative solution. For most members of Congress, the federal tax
problems of the wealthy in the area of gratuitous transfers may not be a
high priority matter. If the tough tax reform approach is pursued, leg-
islators will be sensitive to the risk of creating an unexpected backlash
from a seemingly sound change, as illustrated by their experience with
carryover basis for property acquired from a decedent. 94 The quality
187. For example, the grantor's voting power can be utilized directly or indirectly to provide
appointment as an officer or employee, and to vote dividends on all shares, including those re-
tained by the grantor.
In B rum, the government argued unsuccessfully that both paragraphs (1) and (2) of section
2036 were applicable. 408 U.S. at 131, 145.
188. For instance, the "adverse party" feature of the income tax rules, I.R.C. § 672(a), and the
grantor "alone" or "in conjunction with any other person" feature of the estate tax rules, I.R.C.
§§ 2036, 2038, are at issue. See text accompanying notes 168 and 180 supra.
189. For example, the meaning of the right "to designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the property or the income therefrom," I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2), could be judicially altered. See
text accompanying note 110 supra.
190. For a contrary view, see Pedrick 718.
191. Recently Mr. Justice Blackmun worried that the Court's decision to deny certiorari in
Singleton v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 320 (1975), may have reflected "a natural reluctance to take
on another complicated tax case that is devoid of glamour and emotion. 99 S. Ct. 335, 337
(1978).
192. For a discussion of the Court's handling of the grantor's retained life estate problem, see
Pedrick 708.
193. Compare United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966) with United States v. Byrum,
408 U.S. 125 (1972). Despite efforts at reconciliation in the latter case, both the result and the
attitude of the majority are different.
194. The heat from taxpayers became so intense that Congress, after ineffectually thrashing
about among various alternatives, simply postponed the effective date for I.R.C. § 1023 until the
end of 1979. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2884.
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of the legislative process dealing with the major estate and gift tax revi-
sions in 1976 was poor.' 95 Nevertheless, it seems inappropriate to delay
reconsideration of a set of rules that have remained largely untouched
for at least a quarter of a century in a form that strikes many observers
as riddled with inconsistency and illusion. Estate planning profession-
als should support review of these rules with an advance commitment
to resist the normal inclination to treat tax revision or reform as merely
a code word for tax reduction.
195. Significant chunks of the estate and gift tax provisions, which were originally contained
in a separate bill, H.R. 14844, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), approved by the House Ways and
Means Committee, were simply incorporated in the conference committee version of the final tax
bill. The bulky Technical Corrections bill, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 701-703, 92 Stat. 2897 (1978),
testifies to the hurried consideration of the 1976 bill that was rushed through Congress as it raced
to adjournment in a presidential election year.
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